What validly changed this person's position?
Most arguments about authority start late. They ask whether a rule was broken, whether a court has ruled, whether an order was carried out. Default Liberty starts with the person the rule is said to bind.
An explanatory overview written for this site. It is not canonical. It creates no doctrine. Canon controls.
The starting position
A person begins as a normative subject, at liberty or in whatever valid position they already hold. That standing does not lapse because someone is unconscious, cannot communicate, or lacks competence for a particular decision. Incapacity does not create a vacancy for the nearest person or the most capable institution to fill.
Instead of asking why this person should be free, the theory asks what changed. Whoever says the position has changed carries the burden, and must establish four things: the source of the change, the facts that activate it, the relation it creates, and how far that relation reaches. Where a valid claim or duty already exists, the same question applies to changing that.
None of this makes liberty a trump over every rule. People injure one another, acquire resources, make promises, delegate authority, form associations and firms, and sometimes need others to decide for them. A workable theory has to explain how those constraints and powers come to exist. The discipline is only that each one arrives with its source attached.
Ten questions, kept apart
Legal and political argument tends to compress several questions into one conclusion. A right is established, and a tribunal is assumed. A tribunal finds liability, and a remedy is assumed. A remedy is ordered, and its execution is assumed. The theory separates them.
- SubjecthoodWho is the normative subject?
- Prior positionWhat valid position did they already hold?
- Source or mechanismWhat accepted source or valid mechanism is relied on, and what facts trigger it?
- Hohfeldian positionWhat exact claim, duty, liberty, power, liability, immunity or disability results, and how far does it reach?
- 5ViolationWas that position actually violated?
- 6LiabilityWhat separately supports any secondary liability?
- 7JurisdictionWhat establishes authority over this person and this matter?
- 8ProcedureWhat procedure is validly authorized?
- 9RemedyWhat remedial source supports the remedy requested?
- 10EnforcementWhat separate source supports enforcement?
If a link fails, the derivation stops there. The prior position remains.
The chain is a discipline of justification. It does not demand separate paperwork at every stage, or a compulsory march through all ten. One valid source, such as a contract, a constitution or an agreement to join an existing arrangement, can establish an obligation, a forum, its procedures and the means of enforcement together, and it can do so in advance. What matters is that each consequence claimed is traceable to a source that actually reaches it.
A later stage cannot supply a missing earlier one. A tribunal's finding of liability does not retroactively create the jurisdiction it lacked when it compelled someone to appear.
Where positions come from
The foundation is a closed set of ten sources. Four are rules about derivation itself, and six are substantive starting points. They are commitments stated openly. The idea of a person does not logically prove them, and a reader is entitled to dispute them. Their visibility is part of the design.
Rules of derivation
Liberty–obligation primacy
Any position that displaces liberty must arise from an accepted source or a valid derivation, and extends no further than its source and trigger support.
Residual liberty
Where no source and trigger establish an alteration, the prior position remains.
Foundational closure
The set of foundational sources is closed. Nothing is added by implication; new foundational content requires explicit revision.
No smuggling
Whoever asserts a position proves its source, trigger, content and scope, and the derivation must be open to inspection. No unstated premise may do hidden work.
Substantive starting points
Normative subjecthood
Persons are normative subjects. Standing does not depend on present competence.
Embodied agency
No one has a default liberty intentionally to strike, seize, restrain, confine, compel the movement of, directly injure or comparably use another person's body without valid authorization or another independent basis.
Resource acquisition
Genuinely unclaimed resources can be claimed through bounded, peaceful, identifiable control or use sufficient for a coherent resource project. Property creates no sovereignty over other people.
Serious avoidable bodily risk
No one has a default liberty to create or materially increase a substantial, reasonably identifiable risk of serious bodily injury when the accepted trigger is met.
Emergency non-override
Emergency or aggregate benefit alone does not erase an innocent person's embodied-agency claim.
Protective representation
Decision-specific incapacity supports only a bounded fiduciary power, under the accepted trigger and a valid selection of the representative. Status alone creates no authority.
Closed means that ordinary adjudication, institutional practice, convention, emergency or a desired outcome cannot add an eleventh. It does not mean the ten are infallible. The foundation can be revised, but only through an explicit procedure that names the change as foundational. The Canon page sets out how.
How authority gets built
A small foundation need not produce a simple society. Suppose several people establish an association. They contribute resources, undertake obligations, authorize officers to make defined decisions, agree on a forum for specified disputes, and adopt a voting rule for managing what they hold in common. The institution that results can have substantial authority. What matters is whether its members had the power to constitute those relations, whether their acts were valid, and whether the authority now claimed falls within what they created.
The theory distinguishes five ordinary acts by which people change normative positions.
Consent or waiver
A person permits conduct that would otherwise violate a claim, or waives the claim, within the valid scope of that permission.
Undertaking
A person validly takes on an obligation.
Authorization or delegation
A person gives another a bounded power, without necessarily transferring the underlying position.
Release or discharge
A person with the relevant power narrows or extinguishes an existing claim or obligation.
Assignment
The holder of a transferable position is substituted, without enlarging the position.
They are not interchangeable. Calling something consent cannot make it do the work of an assignment or a delegation unless the act actually satisfies the mechanism claimed. Combined, they support contracts, firms, membership systems, forum clauses, security arrangements, advance directives and the governance of shared resources.
Authority built this way may be extensive, and it remains accountable to its source. A valid majority rule binds the positions validly exposed to it. Counting votes does not create a power the arrangement never established. Participants cannot bind outsiders by agreeing among themselves. An institution does not enlarge its powers by becoming useful, by having a history, or by having been obeyed.
Four kinds of relation
The word “right” blurs relations that behave differently. A claim that someone refrain is not a liberty to act, and permission to care for a person is not power to represent them. The theory borrows Hohfeld's four pairs to say exactly which relation a source creates.
ClaimDuty
If A has a valid claim that B not do something, B has the corresponding duty. The two describe one relationship from opposite sides.
LibertyNo-claim
A liberty is freedom from a particular duty: A owes B no duty to refrain, and B has no claim that A refrain. It is not a power over anyone.
PowerLiability
A power is the ability validly to change a normative position. The person whose position can be changed is liable to that change, within the power's scope.
ImmunityDisability
If A is immune from a change B asserts, B is disabled from making it. Being powerful, official, popular or effective does not remove the immunity.
The pairs are a grammar only. They do not say which claims, duties, powers or immunities ought to exist. The sources do that work.
When a source runs out
The demanding part comes when the derivation stops short. A person needs help, a wrong seems obvious, an institution cannot function as intended without one more power, and there is pressure to supply whatever is missing. The theory is built to be able to answer: not established.
That answer is not indeterminacy. A person may hold a valid claim without any tribunal having jurisdiction over the dispute. A remedy may be owed without authority for the proposed way of collecting it. When a claimed alteration fails, the prior valid position remains to that extent. Sometimes that preserves liberty. Sometimes it preserves someone's existing claim against an intervention, so the rule does not simply favour whoever wants to act. The prior position means the last valid normative position, not whatever possession, institution or distribution happens to exist.
The theory keeps four outcomes distinct. A position may be established. A question may be open to genuine derivation from the existing sources. A claim may be unsupported on the current foundation, in which case the prior position stands. Or the foundation itself may have a defect, which may warrant an explicit amendment. Keeping them apart is what stops interpretation from becoming an unannounced power to amend.
The result can be unsatisfactory in practice, and the theory accepts that cost. The questions it currently leaves unanswered are listed under Research.
What the theory does not claim
Default Liberty is a proposed normative architecture. It does not describe existing legal systems as though they already followed its rules, and setting out its sources does not establish that any community, court or institution is constituted under them. Its internal amendment procedure confers no jurisdiction over anyone.
It does not prove its own moral premises, and it is not a complete legal code: many downstream questions are open, left to particular constituted systems, or unsupported. Most of its components have substantial antecedents, and it makes no claim to historical priority for them. What it offers is the integrated discipline: trace the source, prove the trigger, bound the scope, separate the later stages, and keep the prior position wherever the derivation fails.
Nothing on this site is legal advice.